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The Exclusionary Rule in Parole 
Revocation Hearings: Deterring Official 
Infringement of Parolees' Fourth Amendment 
Rights 
Courts have generally held that parolees are entitled to the 
protection of the fourth amendment1 against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.' Attempts to define. the actual protection 
afforded by the reasonableness requirement, however, have led to 
considerable ~ontroversy.~ The courts do seem to agree on one 
matter-evidence seized through an illegal search by either a 
police officer or parole officer is inadmissible in a new criminal 
prose~ution.~ On the other hand, the issue of whether courts will 
exclude from revocation proceedings evidence illegally seized by 
police officers, has received no definitive resol~tion.~ More impor- 
1. The Supreme Court in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), said: 
The Fourth Amendment assures the "right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures." The Amendment was primarily a reaction to the evils associated with 
the use of the general warrant in England and the writs of assistance in the 
Colonies, . . . and was intended to protect the "sanctity of a man's home and 
the privacies of life," . . . from searches under unchecked general authority. 
Id. at 482 (citations omitted). See also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,624-30 (1886). 
2. E.g., United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787,789 n.2 (4th Cir. 1978) (citing Latta 
v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 248 (9th Cir. 1975)); Diaz v. Ward, 437 F. Supp. 678, 682 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); State v. Simms, 10 Wash. App. 75, 84, 516 P.2d 1088, 1094 (1973). 
3. A major point of division among courts is the issue of whether the fourth amend- 
ment requires that a parole officer obtain a search warrant before conducting a search of 
a parolee or his residence. Many courts have held that it  does not. E.g., Latta v. Fitzharris, 
521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1975); United States ex rel. Santos v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
441 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Randazzo v. Follette, 282 F. Supp. 10 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1964), 
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965); People v. Robarge, 151 Cal. App. 2d 660, 312 P.2d 70 
(1957); People v. Denne, 141 Cal. App. 2d 499, 297 P.2d 451 (1956); People v. Randazzo, 
15 N.Y .2d 526,202 N .E.2d 549,254 N .Y. S .2d 99 (l964), cert. denied, 381 U .S. 953 (1965). 
Other courts have found that it does. E.g., United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787 (4th 
Cir. 1978); State v. Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 1970). See Diaz v. Ward, 437 F. Supp. 
678, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("the differences in judicial expression have to do not with the 
requirement of reasonableness, but how that concept is defined"). 
4. E.g., United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970) 
(police officer); United States v. Hallman, 365 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1966) (police officer and 
parole officer); United States ex rel. Coleman v. Smith, 395 F. Supp. 1155 (W.D.N.Y. 
1975) (parole officer); United States v. Lewis, 274 F. Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (FBI 
agents); State v. Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 1970) (police officer and parole officer); 
State v. Simms, 10 Wash. App. 75,516 P.2d 1T (1973) (police officer and parole oficer). 
See State v. Caron, 334 A.2d 495, 498-99 (Me. 1975) (police officer). 
5. Compare United States v. Farmer, 512 F.2d 160 (6th Cir. 1915); United States v. 
Hill, 447 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 
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tantly, the courts have largely ignored or avoided the question 
whether evidence illegally seized by parole officers should be ex- 
cluded from revocation pro~eedings.~ 
The reluctance of the Fourth Circuit to address this last 
named issue in Bradley u. United States7 is typical. In this case, 
the court held that absent a recognized exception such as exigent 
circumstances, the fourth amendment requires a parole officer to 
obtain a search warrant based on probable cause before conduct- 
ing a search of a parolee or his residence? Consequently, the court 
held evidence seized by a parole officer in a warrantless search 
inadmissible in new criminal proceedings, and Bradley's convic- 
tion based on such evidence was reversed? The court indicated 
in a footnote, however, that while it reversed Bradley's conviction 
"because his fourth amendment rights were violated by the war- 
rantless search, [it expressed] no view of the effect, if any, of [its 
decision] on the revocation of Bradley's parole. " lo 
This Comment will discuss and attempt to resolve two re- 
lated issues: (1) whether the exclusionary rule should be applied 
in a parole revocation proceeding where a police officer conducts 
an unreasonable search of a parolee, and (2) whether the rule 
should be applied where a parole officer conducts an unreason- 
able search.ll Before addressing these issues, however, a brief 
discussion of the exclusionary rule in general should prove help- 
ful. 
1161 (2d Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Lombardino v. Heyd, 318 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. 
La. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 438 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1971); State v. Caron, 334 A.2d 495 
(Me. 1975); and State v. Kuhn, 7 Wash. App. 190, 499 P.2d 49 (1972) with Michaud v. 
State, 505 P.2d 1399 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973) and Tamez v. State, 534 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1976). 
6. See United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787, 790 n.6 (4th Cir. 1978); State v.Culli- 
son, 173 N.W.2d 533, 537 (Iowa 1970); Note, The Exclusionary Rule in Probation and 
Parole Revocation: A Policy Appraisal, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1115,1117 11.13 (1976) [hereinafter 
cited as The Exclusionary Rule: A Policy Appraisal]. But see Brown v. Kearney, 355 F.2d 
199,200 (5th Cir. 1966) (per curiam); State v. Caron, 334 A.2d 495,499-500 n.6 (Me. 1975) 
(citing United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1166 (2d Cir. 1970) 
(Lumbard, C.J., Concurring)) (exclusionary rule could become applicable in revocation 
proceedings). 
7. 571 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1978). 
8. Id. a t  789. 
9. Id. a t  790. 
10. Id. a t  790 n.6. 
11. This Comment will not deal with the issue of what-coiiaitutes m-unreasomMe 
search of a parolee under the fourth amendment. Rather, it will deal with what the result 
should be once a search by either a policeman or a parole officer is found unconstitutional. 
That is, given an unreasonable search of a parolee or his residence, should illegally seized 
evidence be excluded from parole revocation proceedings? 
Although this discussion is limited to parolees, most of the considerations and obser- 
vations regarding parole revocation proceedings apply to probationers as well. Therefore, 
cases involving probationers are also relied upon. The Supreme Court in Gagnon v. Scar- 
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The exclusionary rule is the primary vehicle employed by 
courts to implement the fourth amendment prohibition of unrea- 
sonable searches and seizures by enforcement officials. l2 Applica- 
tion of the exclusionary rule has been justified on the basis of two 
different theories: (1) it deters official conduct violative of the 
fourth amendment, l3 and (2) it maintains "the imperative of judi- 
cial integrity."14 The latter theory rests on the proposition that by 
admitting illegally obtained evidence, the courts become ac- 
complices to the willful violation of the Constitution. Since 
judges are sworn to uphold the Constitution, their admissions of 
illegally obtained evidence undermine respect for the law. l5 
Recent Supreme Court decisions have limited the theory of 
judicial integrity as a justification for the exclusionary rule? 
These decisions establish that the primary purpose of the exclu- 
sionary rule, "if not the sole one," is to deter future illegal con- 
duct.17 In United States u. Calandra,18 the Court stated: 
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the 
injury to the privacy of the search victim: 
"[Tlhe ruptured privacy of the victims' homes and ef- 
fects cannot be restored. Reparation comes too late." 
Instead, the rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful 
pelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), noted that: "Despite the undoubted minor differences between 
probation and parole, the commentators have agreed that revocation of probation . . . is 
constitutionally indistinguishable from the revocation of parole." Id. at 782 n.3. See State 
v. Simms, 10 Wash. App. 75, 79, 516 P.2d 1088, 1091 (1973). 
12. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961); id. at 670 (Douglas, J., 
concurring); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 665, 665-66 (1970) (exclusionary rule is "sole" technique available to courts). 
13. E.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446-48 (1976); United States v. Calan- 
dra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961). 
14. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). 
15. Id. at 222-23 (relying on Justice Holmes' opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 
227 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). Contra, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 
491 (1976); Cole, The Exclusionary Rule in Probation and Parole Revocation Proceedings: 
Some Observations on Deterrence and the "Zmperative of Judicial Integrity, " 52 Cm.- 
KENT L. REV. 21, 50 (1975); Oaks, supra note 12, a t  669. 
16. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,485 (1976) ("While courts, of course, must ever 
be concerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial process, this concern has limited 
force as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative evidence."); United States v. 
Janis, 428 U.S. 433,446 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,347 (1974); Cole, 
supra note 15, at 38. 
17. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976). See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 
465, 486 (1976). 
18. 414 U.S. 338 (1974). 
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police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the 
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures: 
"The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its 
purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitu- 
tional guaranty in the only effectively available 
way- by removing the incentive to disregard it. " W  
In a related vein, the Court found that "the rule is ajudi- 
cially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment 
rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a per- 
sonal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."" Therefore, the 
rule "has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally 
seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons. . . . 
[T]he application of the rule has been restricted to those areas 
where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously 
served."21 In determining when to apply the exclusionary rule, the 
Court has balanced the rule's potential harm-excluding relevant 
evidence-against its potential benefit-deterring illegal behav- 
ior .22 
The balancing engaged in by the Supreme Court, however, 
has focused on the probable deterrent effectB rather than the 
potential injury to society. It is only where the Court has de- 
scribed the possible deterrent effect as insubstantial, marginal, or 
speculative that the exclusion of illegally seized evidence has not 
been required." 
The Supreme Court recently applied these principles in the 
case of United States v. Janis. In Janis, the Court considered the 
application of the exclusionary rule in federal civil proceedings to 
evidence illegally seized by state law enforcement agents. The 
Court first reasoned that the object of any exclusionary rule sanc- 
tion is deterrence of illegal police conduct. The Court then 
pointed out that the "concern and duty" of state police officers 
is criminal law enforcement." Civil proceedings fall "outside the 
19. Id. a t  347 (citations omitted). 
20. Id. a t  348 (footnote omitted). Contra, id. a t  360 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
21. Id. a t  348. 
22. E.g., United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 273-79 (1978); United States v. 
Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974). 
23. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453-60 (1976); United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 350-52 (1974); Alderman v. United Stags, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 
(1969). 
24. E.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453-54, 458 (1976); United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351-52 (1974). 
25. 428 U.S. 433 (1976). 
26. Id. a t  448. Consequently, the state officers were already punished by the exclusion 
of the evidence from state and federal criminal trials. Id. 
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offending officer's zone of primary in te re~t . "~~ Hence, imposition 
of the exclusionary rule in civil proceedings would not result in 
any significant deterrent effect." Under this analysis, the Court 
found extension of the rule to civil proceedings unju~tified.~~ 
Most of the arguments relating to extension of the exclusion- 
ary rule to revocation proceedings are applicable to both police 
and parole officer searches. Differences arise only when consider- 
ing the possible deterrent effects. The arguments applicable to 
both parole officer and police officer searches will be discussed in 
conjunction; the deterrent arguments will then be considered 
separately. 
A. General Arguments 
The major arguments against extending the exclusionary 
rule to parole revocation proceedings place heavy emphasis on the 
special role of the parole system. The two primary purposes of 
parole are to protect society and to promote the rehabilitation of 
the criminal.30 Disallowing the introduction of illegally seized evi- 
dence in parole revocation proceedings may endanger society by 
permitting dangerous criminals to remain free? It is also feared 
27. Id. at  458. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at  459-60. 
30. E.g., CITIZENS INQUIRY ON PAROLE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INC., PRISON Wmowr 
WALU 4 (1975) [hereinafter cited as PRISON WITHOUT WALLS]; R. DAWSON, SENTENCING 
317-26 (1969); C. NEWMAN, SOURCEBOOK N PROBATION, PAROLE AND PARDONS 332 (3d ed. 
1968). 
31. The California Supreme Court has stated: 
[TJhe social consequences of imposing the exclusionary rule upon the [Adult 
Authority] can be disastrous. Conceivably, if the improperly obtained evidence 
were the sole basis for parole revocation, the authority might find itself unable 
to act in the case of the paroled murderer whom the police improperly discov- 
ered had cached a minor armory for future use or the paroled narcotics peddler 
who had collected a quantity of heroin for future sale. Although we recognize, 
of course, that such evidence would not be admissible in a court of law, we 
believe that an agency whose delicate duty is to decide when a convicted of- 
fender can be safely allowed to return to and remain in society is in a different 
posture than the court which decides his original guilt. To blind the authority 
to relevant facts in this special context is to incur a risk of danger to the public 
which, at  least as of this date, outweighs the competing considerations of a 
problematical gain in deterrence. 
In re Martinez, 1 Cal. 3d 641, 650, 463 P.2d 734, 740, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382, 388, cert. denied, 
400 U.S. 851 (1970). A risk to society is created by releasing prisoners on parole. This risk 
would be greatly increased if society could not return unrehabilitated criminals to prison. 
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that application of the exclusionary rule to revocation proceed- 
ings "would tend to obstruct the parole system in accomplishing 
its remedial purposes."32 
Exclusion would place an additional burden of surveillance 
on parole officers in a system that is already understaffed and 
~nder funded .~~ Chief Judge Lumbard of the Second Circuit, con- 
curring in United States ex rel. Sperling u. Fitzpatrick,? ob- 
served: 
To apply the exclusionary rule in the context of parole revoca- 
tion hearings at  the present time would merely exacerbate the 
problems [created by overworked and underfunded parole of- 
fices]; to import fourth amendment suppression law into this 
process would in fact be counterproductive. Parole officers 
would be forced to spend more of their time personally gathering 
admissible proof concerning those parolees who cannot or will 
not accept rehabilitation. Time devoted to such field work nec- 
essarily detracts from time available to encourage those parolees 
with a sincere desire to avoid the all-too-familiar cycle of recid- 
ivism. An even greater potential loss'would be in the time avail- 
able to counsel and supervise-particularly in the early 
months-those who leave confinement with the question of re- 
habilitation in real doubt. 
. . . [A] double application of the exclusionary rule is not 
warranted at  the present time. I draw this conclusion by balanc- 
ing the interests of all parolees in securing administration of the 
parole system which is as nearly consonant with its dual goals 
as is possible at present levels of staffing and funding against 
the interest of individual parolees . . . in not being subjected to 
[unconsitutional] search[es] . . . . 35 
Some suggest that the rehabilitative goals of the parole sys- 
tem require the admission of all evidence relevant to the parolee's 
rehabilitation. A more accurate evaluation of the parolee's pro- 
gress can be made if all evidence relating to his conduct is consid- 
See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972); The Exclusionary Rule: A Policy 
Appraisal, supra note 6, at 1120. 
32. United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1163-64 (2d Cir. 
1970). See United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1975). 
33. United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1975); United States ex rel. 
Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161,1164-65 (2d Cir. 1970) (Lumbard, C.J., concurring). 
Contm, The Exclusionary Rule: A Policy Appraisal, supra note 6, at 1127. See generally 
R. DAWSON, supra note 30, at 326; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSIONON LAW ENFORCEMENT -AND 
ADMINISTRATION F JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECMONS 70 (1967) [hereinafter cited 
as TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS]. 
34. 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970). 
35. Id. at 1165-66 (Lumbard, C.J., concurring). 
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ered." Admission of evidence of parole violation, although ille- 
gally seized, allows the system to remove from society those paro- 
lees who manifest a present inability to successfully rehabilitate. 
This lightens caseloads and reduces supervision duties of parole 
officers .37 
Another important consideration is the effect extension of 
the exclusionary rule would have on the parole revocation hearing 
itself. The Supreme Court has made it clear that the rights of a 
parolee in a revocation hearing are not coextensive with those of 
an accused in a criminal prose~ution.~~ In fact, there are critical 
differences between criminal trials and revocation hearings: 
In a criminal trial, the State is represented by a prosecutor; 
formal rules of evidence are in force; a defendant enjoys a num- 
ber of procedural rights which may be lost if not timely raised; 
and, in a jury trial, a defendant must make a presentation un- 
derstandable to untrained jurors. In short, a criminal trial under 
our system is an adversary proceeding with its own unique char- 
acteristics. In a revocation hearing, on the other hand, the State 
is represented, not by a prosecutor, but by a parole officer . . . ; 
formal procedures and rules of evidence are not employed; and 
the members of the hearing body are familiar with the problems 
and practice of . . . parole.3D 
Similarly, the Court in Morrissey v. Brewefl0 stated that 
"there is no thought to equate . . . parole revocation to a criminal 
prosecution in any sense. It is a narrow inquiry; the process 
should be flexible enough to consider evidence including letters, 
affidavits, and other material that would not be admissible in an 
adversary criminal triaY41 This opinion also pointed out that 
states have an "overwhelming interest in being able to return [a 
parole violator] to imprisonment without the burden of a new 
adversary criminal 
The problem with extending the exclusionary rule to revoca- 
tion proceedings is that it could transform the informal hearing 
envisioned by the Supreme Court into a full adversary process. 
36. See United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1975) (probation); The 
Exclusionary Rule: A Policy Appraisal, supra note 6, at 1117. 
37. The Exclusionary Rule: A Policy Appraisal, supra note 6, at 1127. See United 
States ex ref. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1165 (2d Cir. 1970) (Lumbard, C.J., 
concurring). 
38. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972). 
39. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789 (1973). 
40. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
41. Id. at 489. 
42. Id. at 483. 
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Application of the exclusionary rule would require parole boards 
to make technical legal rulings regarding the su.ppression of evi- 
dence." In turn, parole board members would have to receive 
legal trainingd4 and parolees would require legal counsel to ensure 
that appropriate and timely motions are raised in their behalf.45 
Making parole revocation hearings more complex would make 
them more time consuming. Moreover, the state would fi,nd it 
more difficult to return incorrigible parolees to p r i s ~ n . ~ T h i s  
would not only substantially threaten public safety, but would 
also endanger the vitality of the parole system for those who are 
actually helped by it. If parole boards knew it would require the 
equivalent of a new conviction to return parolees to prison it is 
possible they would grant parole less frequently." 
Two significant facts affect the arguments against extending 
the exclusionary rule to revocation proceedings. First, excluding 
relevant evidence from a parole revocation proceeding is no more 
dangerous to the public in general than is exclusion of evidence 
from a criminal trial. Admittedly, there is a greater possibility 
that a parolee will commit a crime than an ordinary citizen." The 
43. Revocation proceedings are currently informal in nature and lack "technical rules 
of procedure or evidence." Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 US.  778, 786-87 (1973). Application 
of the exclusionary rule would require a suppression hearing which is a technical proce- 
dure. Diaz v. Ward, 437 F. Supp. 678, 685-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
44. This would require certain states to revise their systems. New York, for example, 
currently imposes no specific qualifications for membership on a parole board. PRISON 
WITHOUT WALLS, supra note 30, a t  9. 
45. The Supreme Court in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), observed: 
The introduction of counsel into a revocation proceeding will alter signifi- 
cantly the nature of the proceeding. If counsel is provided for the . . . parolee, 
the State in turn will normally provide its own counsel; lawyers, by training and 
disposition, are advocates and bound by professional duty to present all avail- 
able evidence and arguments in support of their clients' positions and to contest 
with vigor all adverse evidence and views. The role of the hearing body itself, 
aptly described in Morrissey as being "predictive and discretionary" as well as 
factfinding, may become more akin to that of a judge at a trial, and less attuned 
to the rehabilitative needs of the individual probationer or parolee. In the 
greater self-consciousness of its quasi-judicial role, the hearing body may be less 
tolerant of marginal deviant behavior and feel more pressure to reincarcerate 
than to continue nonpunitive rehabilitation. Certainly, the decisionmaking pro- 
cess will be prolonged, and the financial cost to the State-for appointed coun- 
sel, counsel for the State, a longer record, and the possibility of judicial re- 
view-will not be insubstantial. 
Id. at 787-88 (footnote omitted). 
-- 
-- - 
46. Id. a t  789-90. 
47. See State v. Kuhn, 7 Wash. App. 190, 194-95, 499 P.2d 49, 52 (1972) (extending 
exclusionary rule to probation hearings could discourage use of probation). 
48. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972); .TASK FORCE REPORT: 
CORRECTIONS, supra note 33, at 62. 
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real question, however, is whether there is a greater possibility 
that a person who remains on parole by virtue of the exclusionary 
rule will be more of a threat to public safety than an accused who, 
by successfully seeking exclusion, avoids conviction for a serious 
crime. Both have shown a penchant toward illegal activity, and 
there are no indications that an accused left free will be any less 
likely to renew criminal activity than a parolee who remains on 
parole. Indeed, since a parolee who has been discovered in a pa- 
role violation knows that  he will thereafter be placed under 
stricter supervision by his parole officer, it is more likely the 
parolee will observe the law than will a criminal suspect who 
must be released without supervision of any kind.49 
Second, although society has an interest in the successful 
rehabilitation of offenders,50 which interest would be damaged if 
any use of the exclusionary rule resulted in fewer successful reha- 
bilitations, parolees stand to lose the most from extending the 
exclusionary rule to revocation proceedings. They will be losers 
as a class in two ways. Extension will result in parole officers 
having less time to devote to parolees as advisors. The rule's 
application will also discourage use of the parole system as an 
alternative to continued incarceration. Thus, the brunt of the 
argument against extending the exclusionary rule to revocation 
proceedings is that it would do parolees more harm than good. 
The tendency of the exclusionary rule to complicate and disrupt 
the parole system would be more detrimental to parolees than the 
unreasonable searches the exclusionary rule would prevent? 
In rebuttal to the above arguments it has been suggested that 
excluding illegally seized evidence would actually enhance, 
rather than impair, the rehabilitative goals of the parole system. 
Admitting unlawfully seized evidence, it is argued, would aggra- 
vate the parolee's bitterness toward the system, while recognizing 
the fourth amendment rights of parolees by excluding such evi- 
dence would help engender the respect for the law that is essential 
to successful rehabil i tat i~n.~~ 
The strongest arguments favoring application of the exclu- 
sionary rule focus on the right of parolees to be free from unrea- 
-- -- - 
49. See The ~xclusionary Rule: A Policy Appraisal, supra note 6, at 1128. 
50. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972); State v. Kuhn, 7 Wash. App. 190, 
- - 
195, 499 P.2d 49, 52 (1972). 
51. See United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1166 (2d Cir. 
1970) (Lumbard, C.J., concurring). 
52. The Exclusionary Rule: A Policy Appraisal, supra note 6, at 1126. 
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sonable searches and seizures.53 Since parole revocation results in 
incarceration, the admissibility of illegally seized evidence in re- 
vocation hearings arguably provides an incentive to disregard 
parolees' important fourth amendment right against unreason- 
able searches.54 To destroy this incentive for unlawful conduct, 
illegally seized evidence should be excluded? 
B. Arguments Relating to Deterrent Effect 
Parolees will gain as a class from the application of the exclu- 
sionary rule to revocation proceedings only if it actually deters 
official misconduct. Because of the differences which exist be- 
tween the roles of police officers and parole officers, the deter- 
rence arguments will be treated separately. 
I .  Police officer searches 
A potent argument against application of the exclusionary 
rule in revocation proceedings to evidence illegally seized by po- 
53. See State v. Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533,537-38 (Iowa 1970); Michaud v. State, 505 
P.2d 1399, 1402-03 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973). 
54. In re Martinez, 1 Cal. 3d 641, 652-53, 463 P.2d 734, 742, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382, 390, 
(Peters, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 851 (1970); Michaud v. State, 505 P.2d 1399, 
1402 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973). Cf. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (only 
effective way to deter illegal searches is to remove incentive to disregard it by disallowing 
use of the fruits of illegal activity); Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 613 (9th Cir. 
1968) ("the use of illegally seized evidence a t  sentencing would provide a substantial 
incentive for unconstitutional searches and seizures"). 
55. This argument rests on the premise that exclusion of evidence actually deters 
unlawful conduct. Due to the lack of adequate empirical data, it is uncertain whether this 
premise is justified. The Supreme Court in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), 
stated: 
What actual experience teaches we really do not know. Our cases evidence the 
fact that the federal rule of exclusion and our reversal of conviction for its 
violation are not sanctions which put an end to illegal search and seizure by 
federal officers. . . . There is no reliable evidence known to us that inhabitants 
of those states which exclude the evidence suffer less from lawless searches and 
seizures than those of states that admit it. 
Id. a t  135-36. The Court's doubts on this issue were reiterated in Elkins v. United States, 
364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960), and more recently in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), 
where the Court stated: 
[Allthough scholars have attempted to determine whether the exclusionary 
rule in fact does have any deterrent effect, each empirical study on the subject, 
in its own way, appears to be flawed. It would not be appropriate to fault those 
who have attempted empirical studies for their lack of convincingdata. The 
number of variables is substantial, and many cannot be measured or subjected 
to effective controls. Recordkeeping before Mapp was spotty a t  best, a fact 
which thus severly hampers before-and-after studies. 
Id. at 449-52 (footnotes omitted). 
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lice officers is that it would not result in any significant deter- 
r e n ~ e . ~ ~  Even though exclusion of illegally seized evidence from 
criminal prosecutions may deter unlawful police conduct, exclu- 
sion from parole revocation hearings would probably not deter 
police invasion of fourth amendment rights. Only police searches 
consciously directed a t  parolees would be deterred by this exten- 
sion of the rule," and then only in cases where the officers con- 
sider revocation an adequate substitute for a new criminal prose- 
~ u t i o n . ~ ~  Indeed, it is highly unlikely that a police officer would 
ever consider parole revocation as an alternative to a criminal 
conviction unless he were aware of the suspect's parolee 
Consequently, a double application of the exclusionary rule is 
uncalled for. "The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule is 
adequately served by the exclusion of the unlawfully seized evi- 
dence in the criminal prosecuti~n."~~ 
The above argument loses its force when a police officer who 
conducts an unreasonable search has prior knowledge of a sus- 
pect's parolee status." Independent prosecution and revocation 
under an old conviction are often interchangeable to the informed 
officer.62 If a police officer is aware that illegally seized evidence 
may be used to revoke a suspect's parole, he will have a consider- 
able temptation to conduct an unlawful search.63 This temptation 
56. E.g., United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1975); Cole, supra note 
15, a t  33-37. 
57. United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1975) (footnote omitted) 
(probation). 
58. If the crime committed is serious, a police officer may want to be able to use 
available evidence to obtain a new criminal conviction, rather than a parole revocation. 
Under such circumstances, a police officer would have a strong incentive to adhere to 
fourth amendment reasonableness requirements even if he were aware of the suspect's 
parolee status. See Cole, supra note 15, a t  36-37. 
59. See United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1975); Cole, supra note 
15, a t  33-37. 
60. United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1164 (2d Cir. 1970). 
61. See United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1975). See generally R. 
DAWSON, supra note 30, at 145, 319, 342. 
Parole officers often look to police officers to furnish information on the activities of 
parolees. As a result, the parole agency often notifies the local police of a parolee's pres- 
ence, status, and background. TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS, supra note 33, ,at 69. 
62. In United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1971), a probation case, Judge 
Fairchild stated: ''[Yhe fact that an independent prosecution and revocation under an 
old conviction are often interchangeable . . . suggests that abrogation of the exclusionary 
rule for . . . revocation would seriously undermine the rule's effect as a deterrent." Id. at 
820 (Fairchild, J., dissenting). See Momssey v. Brewer, 408 US.  471, 479 (1972) (parole 
revocation "often preferred to a new prosecution because of the procedural ease of recom- 
mitting the individual on the basis of a lesser showing by the State"); R. DAWSON, supra 
note 30, at 363. 
63. See United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. 
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is removed if illegally seized evidence is excluded from revocation 
proceedings as well as new criminal prosecutions. Therefore, the 
deterrent purposes of the rule will be furthered if illegally seized 
evidence is excluded from revocation proceedings where police 
officers are aware of a suspect's parolee status a t  the time of' an 
unlawful search.64 
2. Parole officer searches 
The parole officer plays a unique role within the parole sys- 
tem. As the official primarily responsible for supervision of the 
parolee in the community, the parole officer has two functions: 
(1) to aid parolees in their rehabilitative process and (2) to protect 
society." In this supervisory capacity, the parole officer is simul- 
taneously a counselor to the parolee and an enforcement officer." 
In his enforcement role the parole officer has the duty to 
initiate the parole revocation process when necessary. The deci- 
sion to recommend that a parolee have his parole revoked is 
highly discretionary, but it is not made unless it is believed that 
the parolee has seriously violated the conditions of his parole or 
has returned to criminal activity." Upon making such a recom- 
mendation, the parole officer must justify his decision to the pa- 
role board. t~ 
Parole revocation is not an infrequent occurrence. Between 
thirty-five and forty-five percent of adult offenders released on 
parole are eventually returned to prison? The majority of these 
Hill, 447 F.2d 817, 821 (7th Cir. 1971) (Fairchild, J., dissenting); The ~xclusionary Rule: 
A Policy Appraisal, supra note 6, a t  1125-29. 
64. See United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019, 1020 (9th Cir. 1975); United 
States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1975). 
65. R. DAWSON, supra note 30, at 317-18. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,479 
(1972). 
66. PRISON WITHOUT WALLS, supra note 30, a t  75. The attitudes of parole officers 
toward these roles vary. Some parole officers are "law enforcement" oriented while others 
concentrate on the "social work" aspect of their position. R. DAWSON, supra note 30, a t  
318. Many parole officers express dissatisfaction with the present arrangement because 
they believe these dual functions conflict. PRISON WITHOUT WALLS, supra note 30, at 75- 
78. As a result, some suggest that the present law enforcement role of parole officers should 
be abolished. PRISON WITHOUT WALLS, supra note 30, at 181; R. ERICKSON, W. CROW, L. 
ZURCHER, & A. CON=, PAROLED BUT NOT FREE 101 (1973); see TASK FORCE REPORT: 
CORRECTIONS, supra note 33, at 69. 
67. See, e.g., Momssey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,478-79, &-86 (1972); PRISOb3 W m- 
OUT WALLS, supra note 30, a t  129-33; R. DAWSON, supra note 30, at 339-40, 358, 367-77. 
See generally C. NEWMAN, supra note 30, at 73-80. 
68. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 
471, 484-90 (1972). 
69. TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS, supra note 33, at 62. 
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are returned through the revocation process.70 Since parole offi- 
cers initiate this process and must substantiate their reasons for 
doing so, the admissibility of illegally seized evidence in revoca- 
tion proceedings provides a substantial incentive to parole offi- 
cers to infringe on the fourth amendment rights of  parolee^.^' 
Perhaps the only practicable way to deter unreasonable parole 
officer searches, then, is to exclude the fruits of such searches.j2 
Indeed, if the exclusionary rule is ever effective in deterring un- 
lawful official conduct, this would seem to be a prime example 
of where its objectives could be realized.73 
The deterrence argument strongly favors extension of the 
exclusionary rule to revocaton hearings where a parole officer has 
unreasonably searched a parolee, and under certain circum- 
stances, where a police officer engages in an unlawful search. 
This argument must be weighed against the arguments favoring 
rejection of the rule. 
C. Balancing the Competing Interests 
The determination of whether the exclusionary rule should 
be extended to parole revocation proceedings eventually results 
in a balancing test. Normally, the potential harm to society is 
balanced against the potential deterrence of unlawful police con- 
duct. In the past, the Supreme Court has held that the cost to 
society outweighs the potential deterrent effect of the rule only 
where it has first characterized any potential deterrence as mini- 
mal, insubstantial, or spe~ulat ive.~~ Under this test extension of 
the rule to parole revocation proceedings would be appropriate 
since the deterrent effect could not always be classified as negligi- 
ble. The exclusionary rule's potential adverse effect on the parole 
system and hence on parolees, however, supplies a unique twist 
that cannot be overlooked. 
- - -  
-- - - - 
70. Id. 
71. The problem is aggravated since parole authorities often would rather see evi- 
dence used in a parole revocation proceeding than a criminal prosecution. Parole agencies 
are sensitive to media criticism that arises when a parolee is prosecuted for a new crime. 
Revocation may be a way of avoiding adverse publicity. R. DAWSON, supra note 30, at  364. 
72. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961). But see United States ex rel. 
Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1164 (2d Cir. 1970). 
73. Although the actual effectiveness of the exclusionary rule is uncertain, it seems 
reasonable that if parole officers wanted evidence of parole violation or criminal activity 
for revocation purposes, but knew that any evidence obtained in violation of the fourth 
amendment could not be used, they would be careful to conduct their searches in compli- 
ance with the reasonableness standards of the fourth amendment. 
74. See notes 23-29 and accompanying text supra. 
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Besides the cost to society,75 two competing interests of parol- 
ees may be taken into account in the balancing process. On one, 
side of the scales could be placed the parolees' interest in being 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures. On the opposite 
side could be placed the detrimental impact parolees would suffer 
should extension of the rule result in less liberality on the part of 
parole boards in granting parole and less individualized attention 
from parole officers. Under such a test the potential harm may 
outweigh the potential benefit to parolees,76 despite the possible 
deterrent effect that could be derived from application of the rule. 
There is a substantial problem with this rationale: it requires 
the balancing of two unknowns-the supposed harm to the parole 
system and the potential deterrence of unlawful enforcement con- 
duct. Experience has shown that it is difficult if not impossible 
to measure the deterrent effect that results from the exclusionary 
rule.77 Likewise, it is impossible to measure before the fact the 
damage to the parole system that would result from extension of 
the exclusionary rule to revocation pr~ceedings.~Whould experi- 
75. Exclusion results in societal harm since "the public [has an] interest in prosecut- 
ing those accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the 
evidence which exposes the truth." Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 
( 1969). 
76. Some courts have argued for this conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Winsett, 
518 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1975); United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 
1161,1163-64 (2d Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Lombardino v. Heyd, 318 F. Supp. 648, 
650-51 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd per curian, 438 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1971); State v. Simms, 
10 Wash. App. 75, 79-80, 516 P.2d 1088, 1091 (1973). 
77. See note 55 supra. 
78. It  is not entirely certain whether a displacement of parole officer time by an 
increased burden of surveillance would result in less effective rehabilitation. One survey 
has suggested that there is no correlation between successful rehabilitation and the 
amount of time parole officers devote to parolees. PRISON WITHOUT WALLS, supra note 30, 
at 170-71. 
It  is also highly unlikely that application of the exclusionary rule would discourage 
parole boards from granting parole for a t  least two reasons. First, parole board decisions 
are often arbitrarily made. E.g., PRISON W ~ O U T  WALLS, supra note 30, a t  176-72 TASK 
FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS, supra note 33, at 63. In fact, concern that a parolee is likely 
to return to criminal activity often does not discourage parole boards from paroling certain 
convicts. E.g., PRISON WITHOUT WALLS, supra note 30, a t  63-64; R. DAWSON, supra note 
30, a t  278. It  seems doubtful that a parole board that does not hesitate to grant parole, 
even when the danger of recidivism is high, will be hindered by the prospects of more 
stringent procedural requirements in revocation proceedings. Second, and perhaps of 
greater consequence, economic pressures and the lack of prison facilities require that a 
large number of inmates be paroled each year. See Note, Parole: A Critique of Its Legal 
Foundations and Conditions, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 702,705-07 (1963). Extension of the exclu- 
sionary rule to revocation proceedings will not change this. On the other hand, application 
of the rule might spur desperately needed reform in the present system. See generally 
PRISON WITHOUT WALLS, supra note 30, a t  178-82; R. DAWSON, supra note 30, at 415-24; C. 
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ence prove this damage to be intolerable, however, application of 
the rule could be discontinued. 
It is proposed that courts use the test developed by the Su- 
preme Court that focuses primarily on the deterrent effect of the 
exclusionary rule.7B This test requires reliance on common sense 
and human nature rather than precise legal analysis,"' since there 
has been no adequate empirical data to measure the effectiveness 
of the rule.s1 The test is, however, manageable and workable. It 
merely requires evaluation of the circumstances in given situa- 
tions to determine if applicaton of the rule would result in only 
minimal or speculative deterrence. If it is decided that the deter- 
rent effect would be insubstantial, the rule is rejecteden2 
According to this test, evidence illegally seized by parole 
officers should be excluded from revocation proceedings, since the 
deterrent effect cannot be classified as insubstantial or specula- 
tive as the Court has used these terms." In the context of police 
officer searches, the rule developed for probationer cases in 
United States v. Winsetts4 should be applied. In that case the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated: 
Therefore, in light of the minimal deterrent effect, if any, 
that would result from extension of the exclusionary rule and the 
danger such extension would pose to the probation system, we 
conclude that the Fourth Amendment does not require suppres- 
sion of evidence in a probation revocation proceeding where, a t  
the time of arrest and search, the police had neither knowledge 
nor reason to believe that the suspect was a pr~bationer.~" 
Evidence should be excluded, however, when police officers are 
aware of a suspect's parolee status before conducting an unrea- 
sonable search, since there is a high probability that the prospect 
of having illegally seized evidence excluded from both criminal 
NEWMAN, supra-note 30, at 332-41; TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS, supra note 33, a t  1- 
16. 
79. This test should be followed as long as the exclusionary rule is used as a means 
of protecting fourth amendment rights. There is a possibility, of course, that in the future 
the rule will be abolished or greatly restricted in its application. See Stone v. Powell, 428 
U.S. 465, 496, 500-01 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring). But see Franks v. Delaware, 98 
S.Ct. 2674, 2684 (1978). See generally Hyman, In Pursuit of a More Workable Exclusion- 
ary Rule: A Police Officer's Perspective, 10 PAC. L.J. 33 (1979). 
80. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657-58 (1961). 
81. See note 55 supra. 
82. See notes 23-29 and accompanying text supra. 
83. See notes 67-73 and accompanying text supra. 
84. 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975). 
85. Id. at  55. 
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and revocation proceedings would deter them from such unlawful 
a ~ t i v i t y . ~ ~  
Two important considerations emerge from the arguments 
concerning extension of the exclusionary rule to parole revocaton 
hearings. First, application of the rule would not only result in the 
normal cost to society of excluding relevant evidence, but it might 
also cause substantial harm to the parole system and hence to 
parolees. Consequently, parolees could be simultaneously bene- 
fited and injured through its application. Second, in determining 
whether to extend the exclusionary rule it has been the practice 
of the Supreme Court to apply a test that focuses on deterrent 
effect. As a result, application of the rule has been denied only 
where the potential deterrence has been characterized as minimal 
or insubstantial. 
Rather than attempt to balance the competing interest of 
parolees, courts should follow the past practice of the Supreme 
Court in determining whether to extend the exclusionary rule to 
parole revocation proceedings. According to this test, evidence 
illegally seized should be excluded from parole revocaton hearings 
when: (1) a parole officer conducts an unlawful search or (2) a 
police officer, having prior knowledge of a suspect's status as a 
parolee, conducts an unlawful search. 
Billy Glenn DuPree, Jr. 
86. See notes 61-64 and accompanying text supra. 
